Attorneys’ Fees: Only Congress Can Award Compensation to Private Attorneys General, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1975 Issue 4 
January 1975 
Attorneys’ Fees: Only Congress Can Award Compensation to 
Private Attorneys General, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Attorneys’ Fees: Only Congress Can Award Compensation to Private Attorneys General, Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 1071 (1975). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
ATTORNEYS' FEES: ONLY CONGRESS CAN AWARD COMPENSATION
TO PRiVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
A consortium of oil companies' sought to exploit large oil deposits on
the north coast of Alaska.' The consortium applied to the Secretary of
Interior for rights-of-way and land-use permits for construction of an oil
pipeline.3 Three private conservation groups4 brought suit to enjoin
these issuances, and were successful in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 5 Congress promptly amended the
Mineral Leasing Act,6 on which the injunction was based, to permit
1. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, later reconstituted as Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company. At the time of this decision, Alyeska's stock was owned by ARCO
Pipeline Co., Inc., Sohio Pipeline Co., Humble Pipeline Co., Mobil Pipeline Co., Phillips
Petroleum Co., Amerada Hess Corp., and Union Oil Co. of Calif. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241-42 n.2 (1975).
2. The companies sought to build an oil pipeline across Alaska. The economic
and environmental questions about the route chosen, and possible alternative routes, were
at the center of the litigation. The route selected would have required transshipment of
oil by tanker from Valdez, on the south coast of Alaska, to California and perhaps
Japan. An alternative route through Canada would have allowed delivery of oil and
natural gas directly to United States markets in the Midwest. See Cichetti, The Wrong
Route, ENVIRONMENT, June 1973, at 4; Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline:
Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM.
U.L. Ray. 337 (1973); Ramseier, Oil On Ice, ENVIRONMENT, May 1974, at 6.
3. Portions of the pipeline would lie on federal land, and the Mineral Leasing Act,
ch. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 449 (1920), as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. I, 1973), placed
it in the discretion of the Secretary of Interior to grant rights-of-way through public
lands for oil pipelines under certain conditions. Such rights-of-way were to be limited to
the width of the pipeline plus 25 feet on each side. The pipeline was to be four feet
wide. The companies requested rights-of-way of varying widths, up to 200 feet,
primarily to accommodate access roads needed during construction. Wilderness Soe'y v.
Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 848-49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). Various
land-use permits, required by federal statutes, were requested by the State of Alaska and
the oil companies. Id. at 846, 847.
4. The plaintiffs were the Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.,
and Friends of the Earth. Id. at 850.
5. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
917 (1973).
6. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 111, 1973), amending ch. 85, § 28, 41 Stat. 449 (1920).
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construction of the pipeline; the court of appeals thereupon granted the
conservationists' request to withdraw their suit, and awarded them one-
half their reasonable attorneys' fees, 7 to be paid by the oil companies.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for attorneys' fees, and held:
Congress has withdrawn the courts' power to create a "private attorneys
general" exception to the general rule that attorneys' fees may not be
awarded as costs.8
A prevailing party generally may not recover attorneys' fees in the
absence of an authorizing statute or enforceable contract.0 Varying
reasons have been given for this rule,' 0 which has not been seriously
challenged, but has been frequently revised by statute." Congress
enacted the Fee Act of 185312 to regularize the award of attorneys' fees
in federal courts, which until then had followed state law, and to limit
the size of such awards.' 3  Congress has since enacted many statutes
7. Wilderness Soe'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
8. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
9. We do not think that this charge [counsel fee of $1600 demanded as
costs] ought to be allowed. The general practice of the United States is in
oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in prin-
ciple, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified,
by statute.
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (emphasis in original). For
citations to cases repeating the rule, see 1 S. SPEISm, ATrouNnY's FEES, § 12:3 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as SPEISER].
The American rule has been criticized frequently, primarily on the theory that it
limits access to the courts. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CALm. L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost
of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other
Expenses Of Litigation As An Element of Damages, 15 M-N. L. REv. 619 (1931);
McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 FoRDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included As Costs:
A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLO. L. Rav. 202 (1966); Comment, Court Awarded
Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974); Note,
Attorneys' Fees: Where Shall The Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAm. L. REV. 12,16 (1967).
10. The most frequently given reason for the rule is that the award of attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties would discourage those unable to risk such losses from asserting
their rights in court and encourage needless or malicious litigation. See, e.g., Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). See generally
SPEISER § 12:3; Annot., 8 L. En. 2d 894 (1962). Moreover, granting attorneys' fees
would burden courts with difficult determinations of the reasonableness of the fees.
SPEISER § 12:4. The contrary practice is followed in Britain. See 421 U.S. at 247 n.18;
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.. 849 (1929).
11. See note 14 infra.
12. Ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920-23 (1970). The legislative
history of the Act is limited. See note 24 infra.
13. The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/5
Vol. 1975:1071] COMMENTS 1073
authorizing awards in excess of those specified in the Fee Act.14 In most
of these statutes, suits by private citizens are a part of the enforcement
scheme designed by Congress; successful plaintiffs are awarded attor-
neys' fees to encourage enforcement efforts.' 5
Despite the frequently asserted American rule barring the award
attorneys' fees without statutory authority, courts have equitable pow-
ers to shift fees under a wide variety of circumstances. 6  There
are, however, no clear guidelines for the award of attorneys' fees
under the many exceptions to the American rule.' 7  Three cate-
14. These federal statutes place it in the discretion of the trial court to award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act § 422, 28
U.S.C. § 2678 (1970); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 28,
33 U.S.C. § 928 (1970). For other such statutes, see 421 U.S. at 260-61 n.33,
15. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 §§ 9e, 18a, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 16(b),
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). State statutes not in conflict with federal law regarding
attorney's fees are usually followed in diversity cases. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77(2) (2d ed. 1975).
16. [A]illowance of counsel fees and other expenses entailed by litigation,
but not included in the ordinary taxable costs regulated by statute, is "part of
the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts."-
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat' Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
17. When granting equitable relief, federal courts are not governed by state law,
even in diversity cases. In awarding damages, the federal courts have not felt restrained
by statutes that limit the inclusion of attorneys' fees among costs. Such awards have
been made in varied circumstances. See, e.g., Granview v. Hudson, 377 F.2d 694 (8th
Cir. 1967) (principle stated but fees denied); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964) (private antitrust
suit); Dillard v. Yeldell, 334 A.2d 578 (D.C. App. 1975) (a "balancing of interests" is
required). Even rough categorization of the cases in which fees were awarded as dam-
ages is difficult. Annot., 8 L. En. 2d 894 (1962), dealt only with civil cases in federal
courts in which the prevailing party recovered counsel fees. In the absence of a govern-
ing statute or enforceable contract, such fees have been awarded in cases involving trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition, admiralty, civil contempt, disobeying writ of
mandamus, and the three exceptions discussed in notes 23-26 infra. Annot., supra. The
Annotation noted that, in 1961, 1500 cases were found squarely within this limited
scope. Not included in the total were
Right of indemnitee's insurer defending action against indemnitee, to recover
costs and attorneys' fees from indemnitor ...
Right to recover as damages attorneys' fees incurred in earlier litigation with
a third person because of involvement therein through a tortious act of present
adversary ...
Attorneys' fees as element of damages allowable in an action on injunction
bond. ....
[A]llowance of attorneys' fees to party interpleading claimants to fund or
property ....
Washington University Open Scholarship
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gories of exceptions have recently come to the fore because of their
use in public-interest litigation.
The first category, the "common fund" exceptions, has been used to
award attorneys' fees to a party who successfully asserts rights shared by
others in a common fund.' 8 Attorneys' fees are paid in such instances
from the fund itself and so, in effect, by those who benefit from the
plaintiff's suit. Originally limited to proceedings in which there was a
preexisting fund, this exception has been broadened to include other
common-benefit situations. 19 A second broad category includes suits in
which the defeated party has been excessively obstructive, has refused to
comply with an order of the court, or has acted in bad faith or with
obstinate obduracy.20 The defeated party is penalized by being ordered
to pay the prevailing party's attorneys' fees. The third exception is for
"private attorneys general," prevailing plaintiffs who have vindicated
important public rights or policies.2 This exception to the American
Id. at 895 nn.4-6.
A large number of domestic relations judgments have allowed attorneys' fees, which
have not been limited to the prevailing party. Another broad class of such actions
includes those brought by employees against their employers for work-related injuries,
and suits by union members against their unions. Id. SpEisR, supra note 9, at § § 13:1-
13:45, used a different scheme of categorization.
18. This exception was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), and has been affirmed repeatedly since that time. See,
e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Natl
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
19. The common-fund rationale has been sufficiently broadened that it is now more
accurately termed a "common benefit" exception in suits that resemble class actions. In
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1952), attorneys' fees were
allowed to a plaintiff who successfully secured a refund for himself and 175,000 other
customers of the utility company; attorneys' fees were to be paid from the fund. Cf.
Bakery & Confection Workers Int'l Union v. Rater, 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See
also Dawson, Lawyers & Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 Hmv. L.
REv. 1597 (1974).
20. See F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)
(dictum); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)
(dictum); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
21. The term "private attorneys general" first appeared in Associated Indus. v. Ickes,
134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), which did not involve attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs chal-
lenged an administrative action under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, cl. 127, §§ 1-
18, 50 Stat. 75-90 (repealed Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 649 (1966)). Although
affected only as purchasers of coal, plaintiffs were allowed to challenge the action
because Congress had implicitly conferred standing. There was no constitutional bar:
[Congress] can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the
Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official from acting
in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists ...
Instead of designating the Attorney General . . . to bring such proceedings,
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-officialhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/5
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rule had been accepted by a majority of the courts of appeal and rejected
person . ..authority to bring a suit. . . . Such persons, so authorized, are,
so to speak, private Attorney Generals [sic] ....
134 F.2d at 704 (footnote omitted). Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S.
4 (1942).
This rationale was widely used to broaden standing in suits challenging activities of
federal administrative agencies, and the term "private attorneys general" gained currency
in the courts. See Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). It was first applied to attorneys' fees in Newman v. Piggie
Paik Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), a suit brought under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). The Court found that while the award
of attorneys' fees authorized under the statute was discretionary, such fees should
ordinarily be awarded to a successful plaintiff who obtained an injunction, "not for
himself alone, but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority." 390 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted). Many district
courts seized upon this language and cited it in awarding attorneys' fees under other
statutes that did not explicitly provide for such awards. Most of these suits were brought
to vindicate civil and constitutional rights. See Red School House, Inc. v. O.E.O., 386 F.
Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1974) (violation of due process in cancelling federal grant);
Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973)
(civil rights); Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 376 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ohio 1973), vacated,
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (remanded for proper allocation of award; prisoners'
rights); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (challenging
utility shut-off procedures); Kirkland v. State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp.
1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975) (prisoners' rights);
Scott v. Opelika City Schools, 63 F.R.D. 144 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (sex discrimination);
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (search and seizure);
Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973) (civil rights);
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973)
(private antitrust suit seeking injunction); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii
1972) (freedom of speech); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(employment rights); Newman v. State, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd as to
attorneys' fees, 522 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1975) (prisoners' rights); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1975) (mental patients' right to treatment); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp.
703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afi'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (civil rights); Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (alternate holding), affd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972)
(legislative reapportionment); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971) (civil
rights); cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex.
1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) (award to defeated plaintiff). Contra,
Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972) (civil rights), vacated on other
grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973) (§ 1983 search and seizure).
The doctrine was significantly broadened in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968
(1974), in which the district court set out criteria under which such awards would be
made. Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees after successfully enjoining a highway
construction project that did not comply with federal requirements for housing displace-
ment, relocation, and environmental quality. The criteria for such an award were given
as "i) the effectuation of strong public policies; 2) the fact that numerous peopleWashington University Open Scholarship
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only by the Fourth Circuit at the time of Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society.22
In Alyeska, the Supreme Court found that attorneys' fees could only
be awarded, if at all, under a private attorneys general theory, but that
received benefits from plaintiffs' litigation success; 3) the fact that only a private party
could have been expected to bring this action.. . " 57 F.R.D. at 101. The second
criterion clearly contains a strong admixture of the "common benefit" rationale; the peo-
ple of California having benefited from the litigation, it was felt proper to tax them,
through the state government and its officials, with the cost of bringing the suit.
The states have shown little interest in a judicially-created private attorney general
doctrine. This is not surprising, considering the doctrine's peculiarly federal origin in
issues of standing, its application to federal question cases, and its rationale as the
implicit intent of Congress. See, e.g., Roe v. Board of Regents, - Ariz. -, 534 P.2d
285 (1975) (successful constitutional challenge to abortion regulations; court declined to
accept private-attorney-general exception).
22. At the time Alyeska was argued, the private attorney general doctrine had been
accepted in the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits. Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.), rev'd mem., 96 S. Ct.
19 (1975) (prisoners' rights case); Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975)
(voting rights case); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd inem., 421
U.S. 983 (1975) (civil rights, prisoners' rights); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143
(8th Cir. 1974) (civil rights); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded for consideration of alternate grounds for award, 507
F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1975) (civil rights case on behalf of black teachers); Fairley v.
Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (reapportionment); Stolberg v. Members of Bd.
of Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 471
F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (freedom of speech);
Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (civil rights case); Knight v. Auciello,
453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (civil rights case); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (civil rights); United Steelworkers of America v. Butler Mfg.
Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971).
The private attorney general doctrine had also figured in five cases that had been
before the Supreme Court. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116
(1974) (attorneys' fees denied on other grounds); Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696
(1974); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (decided on other grounds);
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (decided on other grounds); Sims v. Amos, 409 U.S.
942 (1972), aff'g mem. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (alternate holding).
The private attorney general doctrine had been favored by a number of authorities.
Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases Before the Subcomm.
on Representation of Citizen Interests, Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); Nussbaum, Attorneys' Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
300 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental
Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1222 (1973). See also sources cited note 9 supra.
Before Alyeska, it was widely assumed that the private attorney general doctrine had
been well established, although the Supreme Court had not yet ruled directly on the
issue. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties in Alyeska did not dispute the
existence of the exception; briefs were devoted almost entirely to whether the pre-
sumed doctrine was applicable in the case. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Brief
for Respondent, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Congress had forbidden awards on that basis.2 3 This conclusion was
based on a construction of the Fee Act of 1853,24 enacted, the Court
found, to reaffirm the rule that "attorneys' fees are not ordinarily
recoverable. ' 25 The Fee Act did not alter the courts' equitable power to
23. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
24. The statute upon which the Court principally relied was the modem version of
the Fee Act of 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (1853), which has been reenacted regularly and
is now 28 U.S.C. § 1920-23 (1970). The unilluminating history of the Act is given in
421 U.S. at 244-60, but the Court relied principally upon the present language:
Taxation of costs.
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the fol-
lowing:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic tran-
script necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under Section 1923 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case, and upon allowance, included in
the judgment or decree.
28 U.S.C. 1 1920 (1970).
Docket fees and costs of briefs.
(a) Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States may
be taxed as costs as follows:
$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether en-
tered by the court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases,
except that in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libel-
lant recovers less than $50 the proctor's docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
(b) The docket fees of United States attorneys shall be paid to the clerk
of court and by him paid into the Treasury.
(c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the briefs
of the successful party not more than:
$25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000;
$50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000;
$75 where the amount involved is over $5,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970).
The statutory language is essentially unchanged from the 1853 Act, and the amounts
of docket fees have not changed. What were reasonable fees a century ago have become,
by the steady erosion of inflation, inconsequential amounts. It was the small size of the
docket fees that allowed the Court to argue that the fee schedule represented, in effect, a
denial of attorneys' fees.
25. 421 U.S. at 257. Congressional intent to disallow attorneys' fees awards was
found in enactment of a statute that permits those awards; the Court apparently believed,
but did not say, that failure to increase the awards revealed a congressional intent to
disallow them.
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award attorneys' fees under the well-established "common-benefit" and
"bad-faith" exceptions. By enacting other statutes that allowed or re-
quired the award of attorneys' fees to private attorneys general, how-
ever, Congress reserved to itself the power to create that exception in
specific circumstances.2 6 If courts were permitted to adopt a private at-
torneys general doctrine, the range of discretion necessarily involved
would allow the courts to "jettison" the traditional rule entirely.27 Fur-
thermore, the courts would repeatedly come into conflict with Con-
gress' explicit withdrawal of authority to award attorneys' fees in suc-
cessful suits against the United States. 28 It would therefore be an inva-
sion of the legislature's province for the judiciary to fashion a private
attorneys general exception.2 9
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, reasoning that the numer-
ous exceptions to the American rule created by the courts were founded,
as the majority conceded, on the inherent equitable powers of the
judiciary.30 The Fee Act could not be construed as withdrawing this
authority, for, Justice Marshall observed, the Supreme Court had held
that the statute did not deprive the courts of equitable powers to award
attorney's fees; the Fee Act was an "exception" to the American rule,
not its "embodiment."'3 1 The Mineral Leasing Act3 2 and National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act,33 which were at issue in the courts below, did not
provide explicitly for the award of attorneys' fees, but Justice Marshall
refused to interpret this silence to mean that awards of fees were pro-
hibited: "[I]mplied restrictions on the power to do equity are disfa-
vored. 's4 Noting that the Court had awarded attorneys' fees in the face
26. Id. at 260-62.
27. Id. at 263.
28. Id. at 267, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) (costs allowed against the United
States "shall not include attorneys' fees").
29. Id. at 268. This line of argument, based on statutory construction, was not
urged by Alyeska in its petition or brief, and so was not rebutted by respondents; nor had
the argument appeared in lower court decisions. Commentaries had customarily treated
the Fee Act as an exception to the court-made rule denying attorneys' fees as costs, and
most litigation under the statute had been brought by attorneys attempting to recover
docket fees according to the statutory schedule. See, e.g., SPEIsER §§ 12:22-12:46.
30. 421 U.S. at 272, citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
31. Id. at 280, quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 718 n.11 (1967) (§ 1923 termed a "general exception" to the American rule).
32. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
34. 421 U.S. at 281, citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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of much stronger evidence of contrary Congressional intent than was
found in Alyeska,3 5 Justice Marshall concluded that the Court should
have recognized the private attorneys general exception. He suggested
that prevailing plaintiffs recover attorneys' fees, when
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily
shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiffs'
pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally justify
incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the defend-
ant would effectively place it on a class that benefits from the liti-
gation.3"
The circumstances of this suit, Justice Marshall said, met these cri-
teria."1
Neither the majority nor the dissent dealt explicitly with a severe
difficulty in a judicially-established private attorneys general exception
-the possibility of conflict between courts and Congress-although
35. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970), the Court accepted the argument that provisions of a statute which did
not specify the authority to award attorneys' fees nevertheless implied such authority
even though other sections of the same statute included express provisions for recovery
of attorneys' fees.
36. 421 U.S. at 285.
37. Id. at 285-88. Justice Marshall claimed that the public was the class that
benefited from the litigation. The environmental groups forced Congress to revise the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 rather than permit its continued evasion. More stringent
safety and environmental standards were included in the revised statute, 30 U.S.C. § 185
(Supp. II1, 1973), and a greater degree of compliance with NEPA was secured, although
the environmental issues were never reached by the court of appeals.
Justice Marshall did not indicate what "important right" had been vindicated, nor why
the right was important. The second criterion presented no difficulty, but the third
required extended discussion. The class that benefited from the litigation, if any, would
be the citizenry of the United States, but 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) forbade shifting
attorneys' fees to the United States in most cases. A second possibility, taxing the fees
to the State of Alaska, had been rejected by the court of appeals. That option would
have raised a constitutional question, since some courts have held that such awards are
barred by the eleventh amendment. E.g., San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dept., 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974). Contra, Kirkland v. Department of
Correctional Servs., 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally Note, At-
torneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1875 (1975). Of the
three defendants in the case, Ayeska was least able to shift the burden of fees to the
public generally, but it was the only one not foreclosed by statutes or, possibly, the
Constitution. Marshall argued that the oil companies did business in 49 states and
accounted for 20 percent of the national oil market; the companies were therefore able to
"redistribute the additional cost to the general public." 421 U.S. at 288. This reasoning
strongly resembles the enterprise liability theories gaining some acceptance in tort law.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
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that difficulty was well displayed in Alyeska. Three conservation
groups had halted work on the pipeline for three years, and had
sought a permanent bar to construction along the route chosen by the oil
companies. In such circumstances an award might easily have ap-
peared to be a tax levied on private companies to support efforts to
obstruct a program favored by Congress. Justice Marshall's criteria
would not assist courts in forestalling such difficulties, for he gave no
hint of what "rights" were "important" enough to warrant protection,
nor did he say how the importance of the environmental and economic
objections raised by plaintiffs should have been measured against the
value of the oil the companies wished to transport, or the losses they
suffered in delay.38
If Marshall's criteria failed to resolve such difficulties, the majority
sought merely to evade them. Justice White noted the difficulty courts
would have in determining what were "important" rights whose vindica-
tion should be financed by defeated defendants, but concluded only
that Congress must unravel this difficult question."" This conclu-
sion seems disingenuous. Congress could not easily enact a stat-
ute permitting courts, in their discretion, to award attorneys' fees
to successful plaintiffs who vindicate important public rights or poli-
cies. An exception this broad would clearly swallow a rule which
Congress approves. To draw the statute more narrowly, Congress
would have to specify what is "important," and this is precisely the
term that eludes definition. Constitutional rights are important, but to
allow the award of attorneys fees in all suits in which constitutional
rights are asserted would again dissolve the rule into the exception. No
general category of rights is obviously of more importance than
38. Added construction costs attributable to the three-year delay in construction
were estimated by the court of appeals at roughly $600 million. Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1974). An estimate of $12-.15 billion in
"resource costs" of the delay was made in Myers, Federal Decisionmaking and The
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 915 (1975). The three judges who dissented in
the court of appeals used extraordinarily strong language in characterizing the plaintiff
conservation groups' action as a "substantial disservice to our country." 495 F.2d at
1043. In a separate dissent, Judge MacKinnon said, "When we subsidize lawyers to
bring such suits against our national interests we promote our own destruction." 495
F.2d at 1041 (emphasis in original). Strong language has also been used to describe the
private attorneys general theory in other settings. See, e.g., Robinson v. Union Carbide
Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731, 734 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (footnote omitted): "[C]lothing the
'solicitors' with the grand name of 'private attorneys general'. ... What perfidy."
39. 421 U.S. at 264.
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constitutional rights; in fact, general categorization seems no more
possible for Congress than for the Court.4
Instead of formulating a general rule, Congress might review each
existing statute and designate those that involve important rights. Aside
from the absurdity of such a procedure, Congress could not foresee that,
for instance, the right-of-way limitations in a 1920 statute would be
used to protect important public rights fifty years later. In recent years
Congress has enacted statutes for attorneys' fee awards to private attor-
neys general in specific circumstances, but has not attempted to revise
the many existing statutes. This behavior is consistent with a determi-
nation by Congress that the courts should create exceptions in suitable
cases arising under older statutes. The Court, however, held that
Congress intended to prohibit the courts from making private attorneys
general awards under existing statutes.
Although Congress cannot easily enact a general statute providing for
private attorneys general awards, lower courts may be able to accom-
plish a similar result by ingenious application of the remaining
exceptions to the rule against awarding attorneys' fees. Within weeks of
the Alyeska decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that an award of attorneys' fees, made under the private attorney
general exception before Alyeska, could be sustained as within the
"obstinate obduracy" exception. 4' Similarly, the private attorneys gen-
eral doctrine, as formulated by Marshall, and disowned by the majority,
strongly resembles the common-benefit doctrine.42  A shift in nomen-
40. Three months after Alyeska, however, Congress identified one class of rights as
of the greatest importance. On August 6, 1975, it added § 14(e) to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(l)(e) (Supp. 1976), which provides in its entirety:
In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth
or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.
In Lytle v. Commissioners, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1976) (reapportionment), the district
court awarded attorneys' fees on alternative theories of common benefit and private
attorneys general. The court of appeals held that Alyeska would have required reversal,
but that the enactment of § 14(e) of the Voting Rights Act provided authority for the
award. The Fourth Circuit quoted with approval the trial court's statement, "'If I can
find legal authority to award attorney's fees, I want to do that."' Id. at -, quoting -.
41. In Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.C. 1974), affd, 517 F.2d 3 (4th
Cir. 1975), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) free-speech case, attorneys' fees were awarded on
a private attorneys general theory. After the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, but on an "obdurate obstinacy" theory, 517 F.2d at 6, an
alternative ground relied upon in the court below, 374 F. Supp. at 139.
42. See text accompanying notes 19 & 26 supra. In Federation of Civic Ass'ns v.
Volpe, 520 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court of appeals ordered the district court toWashington University Open Scholarship
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clature, therefore, may evade the effects of Alyeska in many instances
that would have been thought of as private attorneys general cases .4
The underlying question of when attorneys' fees should be awarded
to the winning party in public-interest litigation remains unanswered. 44
This question eventually will need resolution, given the increasing
number of such suits and the evident inclination of lower courts to
award attorneys' fees to those serving the public interest.
reconsider, on a common-benefit theory, its denial of an award of attorneys' fees to
successful plaintiffs. The appeal had been urged solely on a private attorneys general
theory.
43. See Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975) (private attorneys general
award affirmed as within obstinate obduracy exception); notes 40 & 41 supra. The
precise effect of Alyeska is far from clear. Most of the lower court decisions affirming a
private attorneys general doctrine dealt with civil rights statutes and borrowed some of
the language of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), see note
21 supra, in finding a congressional designation of those statutes or rights as important.
Whether the Supreme Court will find that these cases correctly construed the intent of
Congress remains to be seen. Although in Alyeska the Court said these cases were
decided wrongly, 421 U.S. at 270 n.46, the specific issues have not yet been before it. It
has been argued persuasively that the private attorneys general exception can be
maintained for civil rights cases without otherwise altering the usual American rule. See
Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD.
L. REv. 379, 414 (1973). But see Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir.
1975) (Alyeska applied to civil rights case). Such an exception based on congressional
intent would not conflict with Alyeska. In cases in which a money award is possible and
a common benefit rationale can easily be applied, Alyeska would not alter the present
exception to the American rule. The case does preclude the award of attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs in cases brought under environmental statutes. It is not at all
clear why the Court should suppose Congress meant not to encourage such suits. Private
suits have consistently been an important factor in the enforcement of environmental
statutes. See Wilderness Soe'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1034 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Nor is it clear why environmental values, which courts have treated with the utmost
gravity, see Scientists Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973), as affecting all of the public and generations unborn, should be given less weight
than the rights of claimants to an estate, a typical common benefit context.
44. The private attorneys general doctrine first appeared as a result of judicial
efforts to broaden standing to challenge administrative action, see note 21 supra, and so
it is no surprise that -this question presents itself to administrative agencies as well as to
courts.
The contrast between expansive participation rights in theory and limited pub-
lic interest representation in practice [because of the high costs of litigation]
is likely to generate demands for new measures to ensure adequate funding for
public interest representation in agency proceedings.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 H~av. L. REv. 1669,
1773 (1975).
The possibility of giving public assistance to intervenors on behalf of the public
interest has been considered in some agencies. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
Press Release, Aug. 25, 1975. See generally Note, Federal Agency Assistance to
Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HIv. L. REv. 1815 (1975).
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